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The Storrs Lectures at Yale have produced sharply differing views of
law. In 1974, Grant Gilmore said "[t]he function of law. . . is to provide
a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light of broadly con-
ceived principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a gen-
eral consensus among us."' Seven years later Clifford Geertz, the anthro-
pologist, objected to Gilmore's concept of law.2 Law, Geertz argued, "is
not a bounded set of norms, rules, principles, values, or whatever from
which jural responses to distilled events can be drawn, but part of a dis-
tinctive manner of imagining the real."3 Geertz pointed to legal sensibil-
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1. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977).
2. 0. GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWL-
EDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS ON INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 216-17 (1983). For an analysis of
Geertz's writings and how they fit into anthropological theory, see Ortner, Theory in Anthropology
Since the Sixties, 26 ComP. STUDY Soc'Y & HIST. 126 (1984).
3. C. GEERTZ, supra note 2, at 173.
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ity, a "complex of characterizations and imaginings, stories about events
cast in imagery about principles. . . ."' Law, he insisted, is meaning and
not machinery; moreover, we all live under the overlapping jurisdictions of
a pluralism of legal meanings. 5
The debate, of course, is between partisans of the most sophisticated
approaches of legal scholars and those who demand that we look beyond
legal scholarship to understand the place of law in society.' Historically,
the subject of legal studies has expanded constantly.' Legal scholars began
by arranging rules in logical patterns, turned to seeing rules as means to
social ends, and then recognized that rules are only part of a legal system.
However, many law professors experience vertigo when they open the
doors and look outside appellate courtrooms. There is too much to look at,
and it becomes difficult to produce elegant theories of law. Neither thick
description nor statistics resolve normative choices.' The functioning
American legal system involves much that many law professors want to
deny. Those whose personalities need order slam the door quickly and
turn back to rules and great cases decided by elite appellate courts.
If we mustered our courage and lifted our eyes from the pages of appel-
late reports and books written by famous dead Europeans, what might we
4. Id. at 215.
5. Id. at 232.
6. Geertz does not admire legal scholarship: "[The issue that faces us is . . . how we need to
think about legal process as a general phenomenon in the world, now that the pieties of natural law,
the simplicities of legal positivism, or the evasions of legal realism no longer seem of very much help."
Id. at 224.
7. Of course, my simplified story of legal scholarship is an example of transposing a messy history
into a neat pattern of linear time. Thus, it is a first example of what Carol Greenhouse talks about in
her article in this symposium. See GreenhouseJust in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitima-
tion of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631 (1989).
8. But see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr (1974). Gilmore says, "Professor Stuart [sic]
Macaulay . . . is no doubt entitled to rank as Lord High Executioner of the Contract is Dead
School." Id. at 3, n.1. Gilmore asserts that leaders of this movement say that legal scholars should
"engage in sociological analysis rather than in historical or philosophical synthesis. It is at this point
that I find myself not so much in disagreement with their aims as completely uninterested in what
they are doing." Id. at 3. Gilmore explains "when you have finished describing something, all you
really have is a list. In itself the list is meaningless-a lot of trees waiting for someone to assemble
them into a forest." Id. at 3. Gilmore forgets that empirical research never is merely descriptive
because the researcher must decide what to describe of all that she experiences, and she will overlook
all that her explicit or implicit theory fails to make relevant. Often empirical research into legal
matters reveals that in the forests assembled by scholars, the trees have the blight or are creations of
fantasy. Often this research shows there are other trees which form forests overlooked by scholars who
rely on appellate cases as a sample of legal problems.
In using Gilmore as an example of legal scholars, I am flattering law professors. He was one of the
best scholars of his generation. Shortly before his death, I pointed out to Grant that he was partially
responsible for my eccentricities. In the summer of 1957, he was teaching commercial law and
Nicholas Katzenbach was teaching contracts at the University of Chicago Law School. I was a Bige-
low Teaching Fellow, and I had been hired to teach contracts at Wisconsin that coming fall. Gilmore
and Katzenbach had coffee after class every day, and they invited me to join them. My first classes at
Wisconsin drew heavily on what I learned from the Gilmore-Katzenbach discussions. A few years
ago, I told Grant that if he had only drilled me more closely, I might never have strayed from the




see?9 Jerome Frank, with little success, long ago tried to provoke the
academy to pay attention to trial judges.'0 Members of the Law and Soci-
ety Association, which celebrates its twenty-fifth birthday this June, have
painted a picture of a legal system that rests on discretion and power and
fosters bargaining in the shadow of the law." Several writers have noted
the extent to which we live in a society characterized by legal pluralism
and private government."2 Large areas of life are subject to private police,
private rulemaking, and the sanctions generated by long-term continuing
relationships.
The symposium which follows takes us down still another path, the one
Geertz pointed to. He argued that thinking consists of "a traffic in...
significant symbols ... used to impose meaning upon experience.""
"Culture patterns-religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideologi-
cal-are 'programs'; they provide a template or blueprint for the organi-
zation of social and psychological processes . . . ." Popular legal cul-
ture is another template or blueprint which we should add to his list. We
cannot ignore it if we wish to fashion theories that explain anything about
law operating in society.
What templates or blueprints are suggested by the symposium which
follows? The papers collected here show that the phrase "popular legal
culture" can cover many things. Culture is not a tangible thing with easily
identifiable boundaries. It is both ideas in people's heads and the stock of
symbols and stories recognized by at least some members of a group. Pro-
fessional and lay legal cultures differ: We can distinguish messages which
legal officials, law professors and political theorists send to the public
about the legal system from legal ideas and symbols we might find if we
surveyed the regulars at a tavern or parents watching children at a play-
ground. Moreover, we should not expect to find a single coherent legal
culture at a place or in a nation. We should not be surprised to discover
that legal ideas differ as we consider class, gender, race, region, religion
and the amount of direct experience people have with police officers, ad-
ministrative agencies or courts.
9. We do not have to forget what we find in appellate reports and scholarly monographs. We
must, however, reinterpret it in light of knowledge about actual legal systems in operation and legal
culture.
10. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); see also Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation,
and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds.
1986).
11. For my view of what law and society research has established which must be recognized by
those studying law, see Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6
LAW & POL'Y 149, 152-55 (1984).
12. See the literature reviewed in Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 445 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
13. C. GEERTZ, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, in THE INTER-
PRETATION OF CULTURES 33, 45 (1973).
14. C. GEERTZ, Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 193,
216 (1973).
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The articles in this symposium argue that popular legal culture may be
influenced by messages transmitted both by legal officials and mass media.
We can order the essays according to their discussions of sources of popu-
lar legal culture; these sources range from personal experience to fiction.
We might expect, although little evidence is offered here, that some
sources are more influential than others.
Most of us get some ideas about law from direct personal experience.
We pay taxes, and we encounter tax forms, instructions, procedures and
the other trappings of bureaucracy. We have driver's licenses, and we
were introduced to another bureaucracy when we first applied for one and
when we renewed our applications. Many of us have received traffic tick-
ets, and the experience introduced us to the role of law-breaker.' 5 Some
have bought or sold real estate, made a will, sought a divorce or gone to a
small claims court. Experience is a great teacher, but we must ask what
these experiences teach.
Barbara Yngvesson looks at what legal professionals see as the not-
really-legal demands citizens make to courts. She points to an important
part of popular legal culture and tells us that people
come to the court with a range of problems, from the quarrels of
parents and children, lovers, neighbors, or other intimates, to conflict
with employers, local companies, landlords and others. For these
people, their understanding of "legal rights" involves the right "to
control who is on one's property and what happens on one's prop-
erty . . . [and] rights not to be insulted, harassed, or hit by neigh-
bors or family members without sufficient reason."'1
Local courts respond by treating these demands as garbage cases. Clerks
and Small Claims Court Commissioners steer parties away from the
courtroom, and into coercive mediation, or towards dropping the suit. We
can guess that those who sought vindication of rights were not pleased by
these encounters. 1
7
15. Cf Cox & White, Traffic Citations and Student Attitudes Toward the Police: An Examina-
tion of Selected Interaction Dynamics, 16 J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 105 (1988). Cox and White
found that among university students tested, "receiving a traffic citation is associated with negative
evaluations of police conduct, specifically, perceptions that the police sometimes behaved in abusive,
even brutal, ways and that these perceptions likely lower the level of citizen trust and security in the
police." Id. at 108.
16. Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE
L.J. 1689, 1700 (1989) (quoting Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working Class Ameri-
cans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 67 (1985)).
17. Compare Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for A Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1808 (1986) (arguing that
Americans are coerced to abandon their rights and settle disputes when they should be able to vindi-
cate such rights in court) with Gibelman & Demone, The Social Worker as Mediator In the Legal
System, 70 Soc. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 28 (1989) (arguing that mediation is positive-




Peggy Davis' analysis of microaggressions against blacks reminds us
that part of popular legal culture is formed by actual encounters with the
legal system.'" Most of us have been ignored, treated rudely or had our
contributions devalued by those in authority. Taken individually, these
unpleasant encounters are but annoyances-what Davis calls microag-
gressions. However, when they happen regularly, and seemingly on the
basis of one's race, class or gender, people learn that they should not ex-
pect to be treated fairly. When lawyers, jurors, judges, and others act con-
descendingly to blacks, and do so regularly, cynical awareness replaces
legitimacy. One observer called this the Saturn's Rings Phenomenon. 9
Saturn's rings are made of tiny particles of dust, particles that would
cause little damage if we encountered only a few. But passage through
rings of uncountable particles of dust is a bruising, painful and scarring
experience for both a spaceship and a person.
Austin Sarat and William Felstiner take us to another setting where
popular legal culture is formed.20 Lawyers educate their clients about the
functioning legal system, and Sarat and Felstiner suggest that divorce cli-
ents, at least, do not like what they learn. Capricious judges, rather than
rights and rules, control. Even when a client wins a judgment or a court
order, it may not be effective. Ex-spouses fail to pay child support, and
ex-spouses deny the non-custodial parent his or her right to see the chil-
dren. Little can be done about it.
Adjudication is characterized by costs and delay. As is so often true, the
American legal system promises justice and delivers a deal. Some get good
deals, but it is hard to buy off people who see themselves as entitled to
vindicate their rights. Client conferences become occasions for doses of le-
gal realism, or cynicism, debunking the myth that law is a search for
justice. As the number of divorced people increases, we can expect dissat-
isfaction to have a major influence on popular legal culture.
Arguably, in providing their clients with this taste of legal reality, law-
yers demystify the legal system. This, however, does not empower most
divorce clients.2 ' Clients may be given choices, but none of them offer
what clients want. Indeed, the reality of the divorce system makes an
aware client more dependent on his or her lawyer's skill at navigating
past the reefs of discretion, bias and caprice, and at negotiating with an
18. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989).
19. Rowe, The Saturn's Rings Phenomenon: Micro-inequities and Unequal Opportunity in the
American Economy, in P. BOURNE & V. PARNESS, PROCEEDINGS OF NSF CONFERENCE ON
WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY (1977); see also Rowe, The Case of the Valuable Vendors,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 40.
20. Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's
Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989).
21. But cf D. ROSENTHAL, LAW AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974). Rosenthal classified
personal injury clients as active or passive. He found that active clients who played a role in the
resolution of their case got better recoveries from their legal claims, and they better protected their
emotional interests as well.
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unreasonable lawyer on the other side. At least in the area of divorce, it
may not be enough to change clients' expectations and ideas about the
legal system if we want to empower them. Perhaps nothing less than ma-
jor structural change would empower them. Perhaps the changes would
have to come from far beyond the legal system.
We do not learn everything by direct personal experience. Legal offi-
cials and intellectuals who rationalize society tell stories which show that
the legal process is necessary, acceptable or just. Some might accept those
stories. Carol Greenhouse writes about a theory that appellate courts and
their interpreters offer to justify adjudication.22 This theory challenges
American common sense about time. The law has been, is, and always
will be there. Judges serve this timeless law, not interests or power. Su-
preme Court decisions are unrelated to such events as the elections of
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan or to Jimmy Carter's lack of an op-
portunity to appoint anyone. Judicial succession tests this story. "All as-
pects-biographical and political-of becoming a Justice are symbolically
suppressed. Those aspects are precisely the ones that would (though they
cannot) resolve the indeterminacies linking the times of the individual, the
law and the nation in relation to the power of the presidency and the
Congress." 23 For example, the Senate hearings on President Reagan's
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court became a morality play
attempting to hide a power struggle. Bork's opponents pictured him as a
man who would rely on his own eccentric views of what law ought to be
rather than act as an instrument of modern American tradition. Bork at-
tempted to paint himself as a mainstream neutral who would bring little
to the Court other than his outstanding intellectual and technical skills.
We might use Greenhouse's approach to analyze the messages sent out by
the White House, the Senate Democrats, and Judge Bork himself.24
Courts also use judicial opinions to send messages attempting to legiti-
mate their actions. Professors, newspaper columnists, politicians and law-
yers may translate the messages and offer their interpretations to the in-
terested public. Peggy Davis suggests that at least some blacks have
learned that the present Supreme Court of the United States is insensitive
to, if not biased against, their interests. They do not see the present major-
ity applying timeless law. Rather, justices appointed by right-wing presi-
dents seem to be carrying out a racist mandate that elected and reelected
those presidents. If the assumptions underlying legal opinions are foreign
to members of a particular audience, these people will see the authors as
22. Greenhouse, supra note 7.
23. Id. at 1649.
24. Karl Llewellyn offered a somewhat different story than the one analyzed by Greenhouse to
legitimate bounded judicial discretion within which a judge's "situation-sense" might operate. See K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALs 121-57 (1960).
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fools or knaves. Legal rhetoric legitimates the legal system only for those
who accept the case made by such rhetoric as honest and plausible.
Davis discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in the McCleskey case. 5
There the Court rejected the empirical work of Baldus, Pulaski and
Woodworth26 concerning bias in Georgia's use of the death penalty.27
Baldus and his associates found what many blacks thought was obvious,
but Justice Powell imposed a very high burden of proof to avoid accepting
what many blacks just knew was so.
For another example of Davis' point, consider Professor Charles Law-
rence's discussion of City of Memphis v. Greene:2"
The city of Memphis, acting at the behest of white property owners,
erected a barrier which closed the main thoroughfare between an all-
white enclave and a predominantly black area of the city. Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, examined the evidence developed at
trial and concluded that the decision was motivated by an interest in
protecting the safety and tranquility of a residential neighborhood.
One reads Justice Stevens's words with incredulity: Could he really
believe what he says? Did this man grow up in the same United
States of American that I did? There is hardly a black in the coun-
try who would not agree with Justice Marshall that the city's action
was "nothing more than 'one more of the many humiliations which
society has historically visited' on Negro citizens."29
Both Davis and Lawrence remind us that the stories courts tell in im-
agining the real work only some of the time with some people. Indeed, it
is possible that Professors Davis's and Lawrence's angry reactions to the
Supreme Court's opinions are magnified by the Court's claim of timeless
judicial neutrality.
Most Americans, however, learn about their legal system even more
indirectly. They have little personal experience with law and lawyers.
Few people ever read the text of appellate opinions or statutes. Few of us
ride in a squad car, play any role in litigation or participate in adminis-
trative decisionmaking. Newspapers and television news, however, take us
25. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
26. See Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Baldus, Pulaski &
Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Chal-
lenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STErSON L. REv. 133 (1986); Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth,
Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons From Georgia, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (1985); Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Identifing Comparatively
Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
27. The Law and Society Association gave the Baldus project its Harry Kalven Prize for excel-
lence after the Supreme Court's opinion, and the negative comment on the Court's opinion was quite
intentional. LSA's citation said, "history will look back on this work as extremely significant on the
issues of the death penalty even if the present Supreme Court cannot appreciate its utility."
28. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
29. Lawrence, "Justice" or "'Just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology (Book Review), 35
STAN. L. REV. 831, 849 n.70 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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to some parts of the legal system in operation. Nevertheless, news is not
social science, and journalists do not offer a representative sample of the
work of the legal system. Sometimes they even misreport what happens.
Moreover, most Americans read mystery novels or watch films or tele-
vision that deal with dramatic aspects of the legal system. Schattenberg3 °
suggests that police and private-detective television programs send infor-
mation about moral boundaries as public hangings once did. One common
message is that the appropriate punishment for being a bad guy is to have
police officers administer capital punishment without a trial in a shoot-
out. However, Lawrence Friedman cautions that we cannot tell what peo-
ple make of books, film and television programs just by reading and
watching them ourselves. 1 He sees a complex interrelationship between
popular culture, the functioning legal system, and the ideas that books,
films and television shows attempt to sell. Armchair self-analysis of our
own reaction is not enough. People will deconstruct Miami Vice or Hill
Street Blues for themselves in light of the way they imagine the real.
Friedman and Stephen Gillers look at L.A. Law, a television program
which is surprisingly popular in the United States and many countries
abroad. Charles Rosenberg, legal advisor to L.A. Law, responds to Gil-
ler's paper.32 Both Friedman and Gillers agree that the program portrays
lawyers and the law unrealistically. However, Friedman argues "[t]he
lawyers of L.A. Law are caricatures; but caricatures are always carica-
tures of something, and that something has to be real."3 Gillers defends
the program against several charges of its critics. At its best, he says, the
program is a series of moral questions that can be developed dramatically
in a legal setting. He asks, "[w]hat difference does it make if McKenzie,
Brackman lawyers consistently ignore the rules of evidence or if they
make speeches to witnesses when they should be asking questions?" '34 Gil-
lers has more doubt about L.A. Law's handling of ethical questions.
Nonetheless, he points to examples where "L.A. Law has taken a hard,
ambiguous ethical problem and portrayed it in a serious, dramatic way
without making it seem self-evident and without pretending to have solved
it."3" Finally, Gillers asks whether L.A. Law's influence is constructive.
His answer is mixed. However, he emphasizes that L.A. Law provides
wonderful if unrealistic role models:
30. Schattenberg, Social Control Functions of Mass Media Depiction of Crime, 51 Soc. INQUIRY
71, 71-72 (1981). Schattenberg argues that our criminal justice system mass processes violators
through plea bargaining which takes place out of public view. Thus, actual law enforcement lacks
ceremonial force.
31. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579 (1989).
32. Rosenberg, An L.A. Lawyer Replies, 98 YALE L.J. 1625 (1989).
33. Friedman, supra note 31, at 1601.
34. Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607, 1612 (1989).
35. Id. at 1614-15.
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With a nearly subversive zeal, the writers and producers have popu-
lated the show's legal terrain with a rainbow coalition of characters.
Women, blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and individuals of vari-
ous sexual orientation are shown as lawyers, judges and other per-
sons of achievement. 6
Others may construe the portrait of the rainbow coalition less favorably
than Gillers.37 Friedman suggests that Americans have a love-hate view of
lawyers. Some lawyers champion individuals' claims to justice, and the
public applauds if it agrees with these claims. Other lawyers champion
unpopular causes or serve their own interests while manipulating the le-
gal system for the undeserving, and the public hisses and boos. Or do
some people admire crafty and unscrupulous lawyers who exercise great
power? Would it make any difference if J.R. on Dallas had been
presented as a lawyer? 8 Such questions are far easier to ask than to
answer.
Gillers and Friedman can only can offer plausible suggestions about the
influence of L.A. Law. We simply do not know how Americans interpret
the series and why it is so popular. Rosenberg thinks Gillers may over-
state the influence of the show. Rosenberg argues that Americans can dis-
tinguish fact from fiction: "[I]t is part of our culture to learn from an
early age what is story and what is not. If you doubt this, ask any five
year old if there are really thousand foot beanstalks and giants."3 9 Per-
haps Rosenberg is right, but L.A. Law sends few signals that it is fantasy;
it looks very real. L.A. Law's messages are complex.
Judge Richard Posner continues his new-found role as literary critic
and confronts Tom Wolfe's best-selling novel, The Bonfire of the Vani-
ties.4" He finds that the book adds little to our knowledge about how lay
people view the law. He says that Wolfe follows better books in arguing:
[the public] expect[s] technicalities to matter . . . [tihey are not sur-
prised when miscarriages of justice occur . .. [t]hey expect legal
proceedings to be interminable and excruciatingly expensive; and
• ..they are unillusioned about the moral and intellectual qualities
of judges, lawyers, jurors, and other participants in the machinery of
36. Id. at 1620 n.47. However, L.A. Law also teaches hierarchy when it portrays legal secretaries,
court clerks and others. Some dislike the lessons offered. See, e.g., Smith, T.V.: Clerical Workers Put
Down, 17 NEw DIREeroNs FOR WOMEN, Nov.-Dec. 1988, No. 6 at 1, cols. 1-4, at 4, cols. 3-4.
37. Cf. Mayne, L.A. Law and Prime-Time Feminism, X DISCOURSE, Spring-Summer 1988, at
30 (L.A. Law scripts often argue that assumptions behind feminist thought burden women in specific
situations).
38. See Hirschman, The Ideology of Consumption: A Structural-Syntactical Analysis of "Dallas"
and "Dynasty", 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 344 (1988).
39. Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 1627.
40. Posner, The Depiction of Law in The Bonfire of the Vanities, 98 YALE L.J. 1653 (1989).
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legal justice, and about the corrosion of that machinery by political
and personal ambitions and fears."1
Judge Posner questions whether Americans really view "their legal sys-
tem in quite so bleak a light."' 2 Again, we might remember Friedman's
comment about L.A. Law. He saw it as a caricature, but continued "car-
icatures are always caricatures of something, and that something has to be
real."' 43 The judge is right when he insists that whether Wolfe reflects
popular legal culture is unclear." But the American audience can recog-
nize these themes, and this suggests that there might be some there there
to investigate.
This symposium raises many important questions concerning popular
legal culture, a topic far too broad to exhaust in seven articles. For exam-
ple, we might ask what people learn in school about law, rules, lawyers
and the legal system. Here we must look at both the open and the hidden
curriculum. School textbooks offer a very simple and formal view of law
when they mention it at all. However, school children learn to cope with
or evade authority, decide whether and when to cheat, and pick up practi-
cal views about the interplay of rights and power as they interact with
administrators, teachers, coaches, and other students. We might expect
that attitudes developed from encountering the micro- and the macro-
aggressions of the powerful at school would be sharpened by the contrast
between experience and the fantasies found in schoolbooks and in class.
We might guess that those who learn to cheat on multiple-choice exami-
nations in school are more likely than others to violate traffic laws and
evade taxes later in life. This guess might be entirely wrong, but the ques-
tion is worth considering.
Americans also learn from sports about breaking rules or honoring
them in form but not in substance. Part of the lesson is taught in school
and part by sports programs on television. Professional baseball, for ex-
ample, honors tricking and intimidating umpires. A cynic might speculate
that American intercollegiate athletics shows that many universities act as
if they honored only the amoral principle: "Don't get caught!""' Gam-
bling on professional sports is illegal in almost all states. Nonetheless,
newspapers regularly publish the current odds, and CBS Television long
offered Jimmy The Greek, a former gambler giving us the inside dope
41. Id. at 1659.
42. Id. at 1659-60.
43. Friedman, supra note 31, at 1601.
44. Posner, supra note 40, at 1660.
45. An Associated Press poll shows that more than 55 percent of Americans suspect universities
and athletic booster clubs of frequently making under-the-table payments to players. Half the respon-
dents thought that professors commonly gave student athletes higher grades than they deserve so they
could continue to compete. Thirty-two percent doubted that this occurs, and 18 percent were unsure.
Wis. State Journal, April 3, 1989, at 2D, cols. 1-2.
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about professional football. This, too, may be an important part of popu-
lar legal culture.
Then we might look at what political campaigns teach about law.
Again our cynic might conclude that recent campaigns taught citizens that
due process and civil liberties are slogans for those who champion the
interests of criminals and that the death penalty is the solution to most of
our civic dilemmas. Furthermore, campaigns for judicial office have be-
come increasingly political. We can wonder how far the successful cam-
paign against Chief Justice Rose Bird in California undercut the legitima-
tion myth analyzed by Greenhouse.
Most of the articles in this symposium identify a source of information
about legal matters and then consider the explicit and implicit messages
being sent out at that place. However, all teachers who have read final
examinations know that not every thing sent out is received exactly as
intended. Listeners and readers must make sense out of what they per-
ceive, and their experience colors their perceptions and interpretations.
Yngvesson argues that, on one hand, legal professionals are empowered by
their capacity to reveal rights and define wrongs, to construct a meaning
of everyday events and thus to influence cultural understandings of fair-
ness, of justice, and of morality.46 On the other hand, she tells us, law is
invented, negotiated or made in local settings.
Both propositions are undoubtedly true to some unknown extent. We
can draw an analogy to classic jazz.' 7 Composers such as Gershwin,
Porter, and Berlin wrote songs which jazz musicians reinvented in many
ways. Moreover, George and Ira Gershwin composed Porgy and Bess, an
46. Yngvesson discusses ideas of scholars such as Bourdieu. See Bourdieu, The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987) (R. Terdiman trans.).
Bourdieu asserts that "[l]aw is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates
the things named, and creates social groups in particular. It confers upon the reality which arises from
its classificatory operations the maximum permanence that any social entity has the power to confer
upon another, the permanence which we attribute to objects." Id. at 838. However, he continues,
"[s]ymbolic acts of naming achieve their power of creative utterance to the extent, and only to the
extent, that they propose principles of vision and division objectively adapted to the preexisting divi-
sions of which they are products." Id. at 839. Naming works "only to the extent that the law is
socially recognized and meets with agreement, even if only tacit and partial, because it corresponds, at
least apparently, to real needs and interests." Id. at 840.
I think it is clear that we must take Bourdieu as saying that legal professionals have the power to
attempt to construct the meaning of everyday events and influence cultural understandings of justice.
However, not all their attempts succeed. If we were to read Bourdieu without noticing the important
qualifications to his argument, he would seem to say that once the Supreme Court decided that states
must desegregate schools, stop school prayers and allow abortions, then everyone accepted these deci-
sions as statements of what was morally proper. While the Court's decisions put all these matters on
the public agenda, Bourdieu does not say that "law creates the social world [simply] by naming it."
Yngvesson, supra note 16, at 5.
47. Compare Karl Llewellyn's statement: "[wiho in the literature or in the classroom has followed
up the implications of Jerome Frank's insight that a court 'reads' a statute as a performing violinist
'reads' his music or an actor 'reads' his part?" K. LLEWELLYN, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 375, 390 (1962). I think jazz is a better meta-
phor. Violinists and actors tend to stay closer to the score and the script than jazz musicians to a song-
writer's composition. In my view, Americans freely improvise on the law.
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opera about black experience. Duke Ellington found the opera offensive.
Ellington's piano version of Summertime48 is a bitter parody. The
Gershwins might attempt to define black experience, but Ellington spit it
back in their faces. Nonetheless, to parody Summertime, Ellington had to
refer to Gershwin's score sufficiently so that listeners could hear what he
was doing.
Similarly, judges and legal scholars compose the law of the law schools
and treatises, and legislators score statutes. However, lawyers, trial judges,
court commissioners, political candidates, office holders, clients, and even
people standing at a working class bar are all jazz performers. They play
variations on legal themes, and sometimes attempt to put new melodies to
the chords. Occasionally, people such as candidates for office or newspa-
per columnists offer bitter parodies of appellate opinions and legislation.
Individuals in their everyday activities have an amazing variety of ways
of bending the seemingly inflexible rules governing these activities.49 Har-
ris, in an attack on purely cultural explanations of human societies, ar-
gues that we have rules for breaking rules. He also argues that we have
rules about breaking the rules about breaking the rules. He continues:
[n]o matter how deviant or unexpected the act, a psychologically in-
tact human being can always appeal to some set of rules someone
else will recognize as legitimate, although perhaps as misinterpreted
or misapplied.5 °
Moreover, legal officials can reinvent the law by playing variations on
its themes. Those at the trial level have a great deal of discretion. Legal
rules are ambiguous or contradictory and allow improvisation. Judges and
jurors can find or fudge the facts to make a case come out the right way,
and some trial judges just refuse to play the tunes composed by appellate
courts and legislatures. Of course, they could be reversed if the case were
appealed, but cost barriers often mean that a local legal official's decision
will be final. Legal scholars assume, without thinking much about it, that
there is a law of Connecticut and that this thing will be enforced in all
courts throughout the state. Lawyers recognize that each courthouse has
its own quaint native customs. The quaint natives-the judges, clerks, sec-
retaries, social workers, local lawyers and others-improvise on or parody
the themes found in the reporters and statutes.
Few of the essays in this symposium seek to establish what Americans
actually learn about what is necessary, acceptable or just from such things
48. Ellington, Summertime, in PIANO IN THE FOREGROUND, CBS 84419 (March 1, 1961).
49. See Karapostolis, Thematization in Everyday Life: A Critical Approach, 33 Soc. REv. 691
(1985) (discussing ways of developing social criticism through analysis of everyday life in modem
societies).
50. M. HARRIS, CULTURAL MATERIALISM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A SCIENCE OF CULTURE 274,
275 (1980).
1556 [Vol. 98: 1545
Introduction
as the Bork hearings, implausible Supreme Court opinions, contact with
lawyers, jury duty, episodes of L.A. Law, or The Bonfire of the Vanities.
As Friedman notes:
[t]he statements made in the text are, of course, not backed up by
authority; they are interpretations of what I see and feel in society,
and they stand on no better or worse plane than statements an an-
thropologist might make after years of thinking and living inside
some distant culture. It is not that such statements are inherently
beyond evidence or proof; the void is an empirical void, not a theo-
retical void. Unless and until the gap is filled, the only test of the
correctness of an interpretation of culture is whether it produces a
harmonic ringing in the reader's brain."1
We are just beginning the necessary empirical study of popular legal cul-
ture.52 Empirical work is neither easy nor cheap. Before risking the neces-
sary resources, we must consider what questions we want to answer and
whether those answers are likely to matter. This symposium is an impor-
tant step in that direction.
What difference might popular legal culture make? When we know
something for sure about it, what will we know? Friedman argues that if
we wish to construct social theories of law, popular legal culture is of
fundamental importance. Most of these theories now ignore or gloss over
the way in which social forces actually affect the legal system. The Ameri-
can legal system has very open borders compared to most others. We elect
judges or they are appointed by elected officials. We elect prosecutors, and
the police are more or less accountable to political authority. Ordinary
people serve as jurors, and their role affects decisions to prosecute, plea
bargain and settle. Those running for and occupying public office com-
mission and watch public opinion polls. Legislators hesitate to offend even
a political minority which feels intensely about an issue, and legislators
are eager to champion a popular cause. Thus, there are many paths along
which popular legal culture influences legal action. Friedman concludes,
"legal culture makes law. . . .[and] social forces, social movements, so-
cial change-and social statics-lead to legal change."'53
This story does not claim that law necessarily represents the will of the
people in anything but a rhetorical sense. The powerful can manipulate,
transform or deflect legal culture in many situations. Well-paid intellectu-
als, both in and out of the academy, can be seen as working to rationalize
51. Friedman, supra note 31, at 1586 n.11.
52. See, e.g., Kiecoit & Sayles, Television and the Cultivation of Attitudes Toward Subordinate
Groups, 8 Soc. SPECRTJUm 19 (1988). Cf. Cook, Another Perspective on Political Authority in Chil-
dren's Literature: The Fallible Leader in L. Frank Baum & Dr. Seuss, 36 W. POL. Q. 326 (1983).
53. Friedman, supra note 31, at 1587.
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legal policies that defend the haves.54 Nor does the story necessarily sug-
gest that legal culture is good. A lynch mob can be viewed as an expres-
sion of a legal culture, and Nazi Germany had a legal culture too.
Legal culture also includes what people see as necessary, acceptable or
just, and this may be the basis for their support of the legal system. These
ideas may affect how specific legal rules or the operating legal system
affect society. Too often we write as if we think citizens are puppets at-
tached to strings held by legislators and judges. However, we have far too
few police, IRS auditors, customs inspectors and other administrative per-
sonnel to watch everyone always. We think of ourselves as a law-abiding
nation, and we say we are not a "Banana Republic."'5 5 Yet we know that
most Americans drive faster than the speed limit, many cut corners when
they fill out their income tax returns, some bribe legal officials for
favorable treatment, and others buy or sell illegal drugs. At best, we are
selectively law abiding; we do not "really" cheat, we just cut a few cor-
ners. We have only begun to ask what working rules Americans follow,
how we rationalize other-than-strict compliance, and how far we will go
when there is a good chance that we will not be caught. Popular legal
culture should supply some of the answers.56 And those questions are at
least as worthy of attention as the mailbox or consideration rules so cele-
brated in contracts courses required in all law schools.
Finally, the study of popular legal culture has another major virtue-it
promises to be fun. I think what lay people think lawyers do day to day is
at least as interesting as legal rules. We may choose to put aside our latest
issue of the Harvard Law Review, or even, for that matter, the Yale Law
Journal, and watch an episode of L.A. Law. As I have said before,
"[p]erhaps, best of all, I no longer need feel guilty as I watch the Badgers,
Bucks, Brewers, and Packers struggle with so little success. It's not wast-
ing time. It's research." 5
54. See Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 A.L.S.A. FORUM 32 (1982).
55. Many Central Americans might find our claim to be particularly offensive when we use this
phrase. North Americans forget that insofar as there is truth in the image connoted by the term
"Banana Republic," North Americans are largely responsible for creating that truth. Most of us
would do well to remember Neruda's The United Fruit Company. P. NERUDA, FIVE DECADES: A
SELECTION (POEMS: 1925-1970) 78 (B. Belitt ed. 1974).
56. But compare Harris's view: "Rules facilitate, motivate, and organize our behavior; they do not
govern or cause it. The causes of behavior are to be found in the material conditions of social life. The
conclusion to be drawn from the abundance of 'unless' and 'except' clauses is not that people behave
in order to conform to rules, but they select or create rules appropriate for their behavior." M. HAR-
RIS, CULTURAL MATERIALISM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A SCIENCE OF CULTURE 275 (1980).
57. Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and
Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 185, 214 (1987).
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